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PROTECTED RIGHT OR SACRED RITE: THE
PARADOX OF FEDERAL ARBITRATION POLICY
Kenneth R. Davis*
INTRODUCrION
A paradox riddles arbitration law. Professing to enforce arbitration
agreements, many federal courts disregard the contractual intent of
the parties.' This ironic result occurs when courts, in the name of fed-
eral policy, ignore choice-of-law provisions limiting an arbitrator's au-
thority. Three issues have drawn intense judicial activity. The first
issue is whether chosen state law may foreclose arbitral awards of pu-
nitive damages.2 The second is whether such law may vest the courts,
rather than the arbitrator, with the authority to decide if a state stat-
* Assistant Professor of Legal & Ethical Studies, Fordham University School of Business
Administration; B.A., 1969, State University of New York at Binghamton; M.A., 1971, Univer-
sity of California at Long Beach; J.D., 1977, University of Toledo College of Law. I would like
to thank Murat Dolger for his help with the research used in this Article.
1. See infra note 11 (listing cases where federal courts have upheld punitive awards despite
choice-of-law clauses in the parties' arbitration agreements that effectively prohibit such
awards).
2. State courts award punitive damages according to various standards ranging from gross
negligence to malice. See RICHARD L. BLAr ET AL. PUNTmIvE DAMAGES § 3.2, at 56 (1994)
(discussing standards of conduct that warrant punitive awards).
The principle purposes of punitive damages are retribution and deterrence. See id. § 1.3, at 9
(discussing the social theory supporting punitive damages); David G. Owen, Problems of Assess-
ing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. Cn. L. REV. 1, 59
(1982) [hereinafter Owen, Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers] (advocating pu-
nitive awards in products liability cases, but challenging the appropriateness and excessiveness of
some awards); Alan Howard Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh
Amendment and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 222 (1991) (arguing that
punitive damages serve the interests of retribution and deterrence and that the authority to
award such damages should reside in the jury). See generally LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH
R. REDDEN, 1 PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1) (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the public policy argu-
ments in favor of punitive damages).
Proponents of punitive damages argue that such relief fills gaps in criminal law. JAMES D.
GIARDI & JoHN J. KIRCHER, 1 PUNmVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE, § 2.06 (1994). Oppo-
nents criticize punitive damages for injecting a penal, quasi-criminal remedy into civil proceed-
ings which traditionally offer only compensatory relief. These critics stress that since civil
defendants are not afforded the scope of due process provided to criminal defendants, punitive
awards are inappropriate in civil cases. See GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra § 2.06 (noting the
courts' use of this policy distinction as a basis for rejecting punitive awards in civil cases);
SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra § 2.2(A)(2) (summarizing the argument that civil punitive awards
blur the historical distinction between civil and criminal law embedded in American
jurisprudence).
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ute of limitations bars an arbitration, 3 and the third is whether chosen
state law may prevent an arbitrator from awarding attorneys' fees.4
Misinterpreting federal policy, many courts discern a conflict between
the federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements
and any state law which impinges, even insignificantly, on the scope of
an arbitrator's authority.5 These courts interpose federal policy to
preempt state law although the parties expressly chose to follow such
law. 6
The recent Supreme Court decision, Mastrobuono v. Shearson Leh-
man Hutton, Inc. 7used preemption, at least in part, to circumvent a
state law bar on punitive damages invoked by a choice-of-law clause.8
Although the Court's confusing analysis left the role of preemption
muddled,9 the Mastrobuono holding clearly sustained the arbitrators'
punitive award despite chosen state law prohibiting such relief.10
Even before Mastrobuono, most federal circuit courts refused to
enforce prohibitions on punitive damage awards arising from choice-
of-law clauses.1' Their view was rooted in a misperceived conflict be-
Critics also challenge the contention that punitive damages deter wrongdoers and others from
engaging in future egregious misconduct. See GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra § 2.07 (expressing
doubt whether punitive damages are a significant deterrent); David G. Owen, The Moral Foun-
dations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 704, 714 (1989) [hereinafter Owen, Moral Founda-
tions] (questioning whether punitive awards deter misconduct).
3. See infra Part IV.A and accompanying text (discussing cases that address the issue of
whether federal arbitration policy contravenes state law authorizing courts to determine if appli-
cable state statutes of limitations bar arbitration).
4. See infra Part IV.B and accompanying text (discussing cases that address the issue of
whether federal arbitration policy contravenes state law that disallows an arbitrator from award-
ing attorney's fees unless the arbitration agreement so provides).
5. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (noting that the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) "was motivated, first and foremost, by a Congressional desire to
enforce agreements into which parties had entered"); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10
(1984) (articulating a "national policy favoring arbitration"); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stressing the "liberal federal policy favoring arbi-
tration agreements").
6. See infra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which federal courts have held
that arbitrators possess the authority to award punitive damages despite contrary state law in-
voked by a choice-of-law clause).
7. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
8. Id. at 1219.
9. See id. at 1218 (failing to explain the relative roles of preemption and contract analysis in
determining whether an arbitration agreement permits punitive awards).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (11th Cir. 1988) (sus-
taining a punitive award in light of federal policy favoring arbitration); Willoughby Roofing &
Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 357 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd per curiam, 776
F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a panel of arbitrators was empowered, under American
Arbitration Association (AAA) rules, to award punitive damages given the "strong federal pol-
icy requir[ing] a liberal construction of arbitration agreements"). See also Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d
883, 887 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that AAA arbitrators may award punitive damages when a
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tween federal arbitration policy, codified in the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA),' 2 and state common law public policy against allowing
arbitrators to award punitive damages. 13 Applying federal policy,
these courts held that arbitrators are authorized to grant punitive
damages unless the parties' agreement explicitly denies them this
power.14
choice-of-law clause in the parties' agreement incorporates AAA rules); Todd Shipyards Corp.
v. Cunard Line Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 287 (1993)
(upholding an arbitration panel's punitive award under federal law despite chosen state law
prohibiting such awards); Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Cir.
1989) (affirming a punitive damages award in a commercial arbitration where a general arbitra-
tion clause in the parties' agreement did not explicitly exclude such awards). But see Mas-
trobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct.
1212 (1995) (observing that federal policy supporting arbitration is neutral with respect to reme-
dies); Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991) (vacating puni-
tive award because the parties elected to abide by New York state law); Fahnestock & Co. v.
Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 380 (1991) and cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1241 (1992) (finding no conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-6
(1994), and Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976), which prohibits arbitrators
from awarding punitive damages, because the FAA is silent on the issue of punitive damages).
12. Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (1994)).
13. The public policy of numerous states disfavors punitive damages awards in arbitration.
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976). See infra note 17 and accompanying text
(illustrating that several states have laws which disfavor punitive damages awards in arbitration
proceedings).
14. Arbitral punitive awards may be challenged on the ground that the limited scope of review
of such awards does not meet due process requirements. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994) (prescribing
specific grounds upon which a district court may vacate an arbitration award). Honda Motor
Corp. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2341 (1994), sparked interest in this issue by holding that due
process requires judicial review of jury-awarded punitive damages. Recent cases, addressing the
due process issue, have held due process inapplicable to commercial arbitration because arbitra-
tion does not involve state action. E.g., Davis v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, at 1191,
1192 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that "the state action element of a due process claim is absent in
private arbitration cases" and that "the mere confirmation of a private arbitration award by a
district court is insufficient state action to trigger the application of the Due Process Clause");
Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709, at *15 (M.D. Tenn.
Dec. 15, 1994) (holding that an arbitration between a securities firm and its former employee did
not constitute state action); see also Brief for Respondent at 41, Glennon v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994), appeal docketed, No. 95-
5257 (6th Cir., 1995) (arguing that, even if due process applies in arbitration, a voluntary submis-
sion to arbitration constitutes a waiver of due process).
Most commentators agree with these decisions that arbitration does not constitute state action
and, therefore, they conclude that Oberg is inapplicable in that forum. See, e.g., Kenneth R.
Davis, Due Process Right to Judicial Review of Arbitral Punitive Damages Awards, 32 AM. Bus.
L.J. 583, 612-13 (1995) (concluding that "the scales tip decidedly against state action in the arbi-
tral forum" because an arbitration agreement is a private matter between the parties and in-
volves the state only inconsequentially); Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:
Contracting out of Government's Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63
FORDHAM L. REv. 529, 559 (1994) (arguing that Oberg is inapplicable to arbitration proceedings
because they do not involve state action). But see Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitu-
tional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81, 114-17 (1992) (arguing that the FAA confers due process rights
on arbitrating parties).
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The New York State Court of Appeals expressed a contrary policy
in the seminal New York case Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. ,' which fore-
closed arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.16 Since several
states have adopted the Garrity rule,' 7 and most brokerage houses,
attempting to limit their exposure, require customers to sign arbitra-
tion agreements containing New York choice-of-law clauses,' 8 the
availability of arbitral punitive damages awards has ignited intense
debate.19
The issue has arisen in a number of guises. First and most simply,
parties, having agreed to a broad arbitration clause which arguably
permits punitive awards, may have simultaneously adopted a choice-
Regardless of whether due process applies to arbitration, the scope of review satisfies due
process requirements because an arbitrator who renders an unconstitutional punitive award "ex-
ceed[s his] powers," and such award is therefore subject to reversal. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)
(1994) (authorizing a district court to vacate an award "[w]here the arbitrators exceed their
powers... ). See Kenneth R. Davis, supra, at 622-23 (discussing the adequacy of judicial review
under section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act).
15. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
16. See id. at 796 (vacating an arbitrator's punitive damages award as violative of public pol-
icy, thus allocating the authority to impose punitive damages to the state).
17. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(5) (1987) (prohibiting exemplary damages awards
in arbitration proceedings); State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Blevins, 551 N.E.2d 955, 959 (Ohio
1990) (precluding punitive award in uninsured motorist arbitration); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs.,
698 P.2d 880, 882 (N.M. 1985) (following Garrity in a breach of contract arbitration); McLeroy v.
Waller, 731 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a tort arbitration panel did not
have authority to award punitive damages); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. DeFluiter, 456
N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (prohibiting punitive awards in arbitration proceedings).
But see Anderson v. Nichols, 359 S.E.2d 117, 121 n.1 (W. Va. 1987) (sustaining an ostensibly
penal award because it was essentially compensatory, reasonably relating to the commercial
loss).
Some courts allow punitive damages if the arbitration agreement expressly so provides. See,
e.g., Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Contr., Inc., 676 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (sus-
taining an exemplary damages award where the arbitration agreement expressly provided for
such relief). Others presume that the parties intended to permit punitive damages unless the
agreement expresses the contrary. See Starkenstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 572 F. Supp. 189, 191-92 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (holding that an investor in a securities arbitra-
tion did not waive his punitive damages claim by executing a general agreement that did not
mention such relief); Complete Exteriors, Inc. v. Behan, 558 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (reversing a punitive award in a contract arbitration on the ground that the parties' agree-
ment did not provide for such relief); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d 726, 734
(N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (finding the language of an arbitration agreement sufficiently broad to
authorize punitive awards); Baker v. Sadick, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (Ct. App. 1984) (confirming
punitive award in a medical malpractice arbitration where the agreement did not mention puni-
tive damages and the language of the relevant state statute was ambiguous).
18. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The Tower of
Babel Revisited, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 591-96 (1991) (accusing securities brokerage houses
of "contractual wizardry" in duping investors into signing arbitration agreements).
19. See infra notes 67 (discussing commentators' criticisms of the Garrity rule) and text ac-
companying notes 69-81 (examining commentators' beliefs that the FAA preempts the Garrity
rule).
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of-law provision invoking the Garrity rule, which prohibits such
awards.20 The issue has emerged also in more complex situations. For
example, most arbitration agreements provide that the parties will
submit their disputes to a particular arbitration organization. 21 These
organizations, including the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) and securities industry self-regulatory organizations (SROs)
such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), have elaborate rules that
establish procedural guidelines for arbitration.22 All these organiza-
tions have a rule explicitly or implicitly granting arbitrators broad re-
medial authority which arguably permits them to grant punitive
relief.2 3
How these broad remedial provisions interact with choice-of-law
clauses invoking the Garrity rule was an unsettled question before
20. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1989)
(involving a broad arbitration clause which contained a California choice-of-law provision).
21. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1995)
(quoting a typical arbitration clause in which the parties consented to arbitrate "any controversy
... in accordance with the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) or the
Boards of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE))."
22. See MARTIN DoMKE, 1 DoMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §§ 2.01-02 (rev. ed. 1984)
(discussing the use of arbitration by exchanges, trade associations and the American Arbitration
Association).
23. See, e.g., Rule 43 of the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules, which provides in part:
"The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and
within the scope of the agreement of the parties." COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION R. 43. Until
1989, SROs operated under rules which only arguably permitted punitive damages. For exam-
ple, the arbitration code of the NASD, the most widely used SRO arbitration forum, provides
for the arbitration of "[a]ny dispute, claim or controversy ... arising in connection with the
business of [any member of the NASD]." CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURES § 1 (1993); N.Y.
STOCK EXCHANGE ARBITRATION R. 600(a), reprinted in 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2600 (Aug.
26, 1992) (providing for the arbitration of "[a]ny dispute, claim or controversy"). In 1989, the
NASD adopted a rule aimed at insuring the availability of punitive awards in arbitrations con-
ducted at the NASD. The rule provides that "[n]o agreement shall include any condition which
limits ... the ability of the arbitrators to make any award." RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE Art. III,
§ 21(0(4). The NYSE simultaneously adopted an identical rule. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE ARBI-
TRATION R. 637(4), reprinted in N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2636 (May 10, 1989). Since 1989,
SROs have considered adopting rules expressly permitting arbitrators to award punitive dam-
ages. See Barbara Franklin, Securities Arbitrations: Rule Would End Novelty of Punitive Dam-
ages, N.Y. L.J. June 3, 1993, at 5 (discussing a proposed NASD rule that would expressly
provide for punitive damages awards in NASD customer arbitrations). The Securities Industry
Association, a trade organization, has proposed a rule change for SROs which would authorize
arbitrators to award punitive damages only under circumstances where courts would have the
same authority. SIA Responds to NYSE: Symposium Recommendations Draw New Punitive
Damage Proposal, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR (Richard P. Ryder, Maplewood, N.J.), Oct. 1995,
at 10. Such awards could not be imposed unconstitutionally. Id. Nor could such awards be
imposed in violation of the law of the state in which the claimant resided when the claim arose.
Id. The proposed rule would subject the amount of the award to any limits imposed by state law
or to two times compensatory damages, whichever is less. This proposal, if adopted, would up-
hold the Garrity rule by honoring state law limitations on punitive damages.
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Mastrobuono.24 Some commentators argued that a Supreme Court
case which preceded Mastrobuono, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,2 5 reconciled
federal policy with the Garrity rule.26 Volt held that an arbitration
agreement should be interpreted, as should any contract, according to
its terms.2 7 If the parties adopt a choice-of-law clause, state law will
govern unless it conflicts directly with the FAA.2 8 Thus, under Volt, it
seemed that the Garrity rule was compatible with federal policy, be-
cause Garrity merely removes a non-compensatory remedy from arbi-
tration, and thus does not obstruct the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. Mastrobuono, however, departed from the fundamental
holding of Volt and casts doubt on how other issues involving arbitra-
tion will be decided.
The Mastrobuono decision has far-reaching implications. It may
forbid the invocation, by a choice-of-law clause, of any state law in-
fringing on an arbitrator's authority.29 One such issue is whether the
FAA preempts state law that empowers the court, rather than the ar-
bitrator, to rule on statute of limitations defenses. Some decisions,
including the recent New York Court of Appeals decision Smith Bar-
ney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie30, have enforced choice-of-law
provisions invoking New York law which empowers the court to rule
on such defenses. 31 These decisions arguably conflict with Mas-
trobuono. Another issue illustrating the tension between Mas-
24. See supra note 11 (discussing several pre-Mastrobuono cases in which courts had either
upheld or reversed arbitral punitive awards depending on their view of federal preemption and
the contractual intent of the parties).
25. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
26. See Kenneth R. Davis, A Proposed Framework for Reviewing Punitive Damages Awards
of Commercial Arbitrators, 58 ALB. L. REv. 55, 92 (1994) (arguing that the FAA takes no posi-
tion on the availability of arbitral punitive remedies). But see Ware, supra note 14, at 571 (con-
tending that the FAA provides a "default" rule, which, in the absence of an express or implied
limitation, permits arbitral punitive awards).
27. 489 U.S. at 474-75.
28. Id. at 477.
29. See infra Part IV (discussing the Mastrobuono rule and its implications).
30. 85 N.Y.2d 193 (1995).
31. See, e.g., Chemical Futures & Options, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 832 F. Supp. 1188,
1195 (N.D. Il1. 1993) ("Because parties may make state arbitration rules applicable by including
a state choice-of-law clause in their contract, New York law applies in this instance, and as a
result, this Court is compelled to decide the statute of limitations issue presented by plaintiffs.")
(citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468 (1989)); Seaboard Surety Co. v. Cates, 604 So.2d 570, 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that the trial court determines whether the defendant is barred from arbitration under the appli-
cable state statute of limitations). See infra notes 144-66 and accompanying text (discussing
Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co. v. Luckie 647 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995)).
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trobuono and state law is whether the FAA preempts state law
restrictions on an arbitrator's authority to award attorney's fees.
Part L.A of this Article discusses federal arbitration law. In Part
I.B, this Article explores the Garrity rule and the genesis of the per-
ceived conflict between Garrity and federal policy. Part II analyzes
the Mastrobuono decision and Part III criticizes that ruling. In Part
IV.A, this Article compares Luckie with federal cases refusing to ap-
ply the New York statute of limitations rule and suggests that courts
will interpret Luckie as being inconsistent with Mastrobuono. In Part
IV.B, this Article examines the impact of Mastrobuono on state law
that forbids arbitrators from awarding attorneys' fees unless the arbi-
tration agreement expressly gives them such authority. Finally, this
Article concludes in Part V that Mastrobuono, although wrongly de-
cided, may benefit society by curtailing the overreaching of securities
brokerage houses.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The FAA and Federal Preemption
Congress passed the FAA in 1925 to counteract pervasive judicial
hostility toward arbitration agreements. 32 In Southland Corp. v. Keat-
ing,33 the Court explained that" '[t]he need for the [FAA] arises from
... the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction ...
This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became
firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it
by the American courts.' ,34 To overcome the anti-arbitration senti-
ment of the courts, Congress enacted section 2 of the FAA, which
provides in part that "[a] written provision in ... a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a contro-
32. See Hearings on S. 4213 & S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 8 (1923) (criticizing the state courts for their unwillingness to
enforce arbitration agreements). For centuries, English courts had an economic incentive to
oppose arbitration. Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial Administration and the Develop-
ment of Contract Law in Seventeenth Century England, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 35, 44-45 (1983).
Judges, whose salaries were often in arrears, charged litigants for exercising judicial power, such
as issuing writs and process. Id. at 45. This financial interest may have motivated judges to
condemn arbitration on the ground that it "ousted the court of jurisdiction." IAN R. MACNEIL,
ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §§ 4.2.2, 4:9 (1995). See DOMKE, supra note 22, § 3.01
(describing the historical "ousting of jurisdiction" concept in arbitration); Douglas R. Davis,
Note, Overextension of Arbitral Authority: Punitive Damages and Issues of Arbitrability -Ray-
theon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 65 WASH. L. REV. 695, 698 (1990) (reviewing history
of judicial opposition to arbitration agreements). See generally Ira P. Rothken, Comment, Puni-
tive Damages in Commercial Arbitration: A Due Process Analysis, 21 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
387, 390 (1991) (discussing the historical background leading to enactment of the FAA).
33. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
34. Id. at 13 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924)).
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versy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction.., shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. '35 The FAA has succeeded in
transforming arbitration into a judicially approved method of dispute
resolution.36 Since passage of the FAA, the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly reaffirmed "the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration. '37
The FAA preempts any state law that interferes with the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements.38 Thus, in Southland Corp., the
Supreme Court held that the California Franchise Investment Law,
which invalidated certain arbitration agreements, was in direct con-
flict with section 2 of the FAA and violated the Supremacy Clause. 39
The Court explained, "In enacting [Section] 2 of the [FAA], Congress
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitra-
tion."'40 Although Southland stated unequivocally that state law may
not refuse to enforce arbitration agreements, 41 the Court had yet to
decide whether federal policy permits state law limitations on
arbitration.
The Court first addressed this issue in Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University.42 Volt
entered into a contract with Leland Stanford Junior University to per-
35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
36. See Douglas R. Davis, supra note 32, at 698 (emphasizing the importance of the FAA's
role in expanding the use of arbitration). The FAA has fostered a climate in which arbitration
has grown into the most widespread means of alternative dispute resolution. See DoME, supra
note 22 § 1:01, at 3 (discussing the broad range of disputes submitted for arbitration); COMMER-
CaAL ARBrrRAION FOR TIE 1990s at xv (Richard J. Medalie ed., 1991) (citing numerous indus-
tries that commonly use arbitration); 1 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBrrATION § 5:01
(rev. ed. 1995) (labelling arbitration "the preferred mechanism for resolving disputes out of
court"); Kenneth R. Davis, supra note 14, at 585-86 (documenting the burgeoning popularity of
arbitration over the past thirty years).
37. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
See supra note 5 (discussing several Supreme Court cases in which the Court emphasized the
FAA's liberal policy favoring arbitration).
38. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 ("In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as
well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements").
39. See id. at 10 (" 'Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person
acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order
hereunder is void.' ") (quoting CAL CORP. CODE ANN. § 31,512 (West 1977)).
40. Id. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Id. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). She argued that Congress intended the FAA to be a procedural statute, applicable only
to the federal courts. Id. at 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 16 (discussing Congress' attempt to foreclose state legislative action impinging
on the enforceability of arbitration agreements).
42. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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form construction work on the University's campus in California.4 3
The contract contained an arbitration clause and a choice-of-law
clause providing for the application of "the law of the place where the
Project is located."' 44 When a dispute arose between the parties, Volt
demanded arbitration.45 The University moved for a stay of arbitra-
tion under a California statute on the ground that pending, related
litigation might result in an order indemnifying the University.4 6 The
issue was whether the stay, invoked by the choice-of-law clause, vio-
lated federal policy.4 7 The Supreme Court found no such conflict and
rejected the argument that section 4 of the FAA, which provides an
aggrieved party with the right to obtain an order compelling arbitra-
tion, preempts the California statute.48 Rather, the Court observed
that the FAA "confers only the right to obtain an order directing that
'arbitration proceed in the manner provided for [in the parties']
agreement.' "49
Thus, the FAA merely requires the enforcement of arbitration
agreements as written; it does not impose immutable procedural
rules.50 The FAA "simply requires courts to enforce privately negoti-
ated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with
their terms."' 51 Since the FAA contains no preemption provision, fed-
eral policy nullifies state law only when the two conflict directly.5 2 In
sum, substantive state law invoked by a choice-of-law clause is pre-
empted only when it conflicts directly with the FAA.53 Procedural law
invoked by a choice-of-law clause, even when contrary to FAA proce-
dures, will not be preempted.54
43. Id. at 470.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 471.
47. Id. at 475.
48. Id. at 476-77.
49. Id. at 474-75 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994)) (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 476.
51. Id. at 478.
52. Id. at 477-78.
53. See id. at 477 (stating that the FAA preempts state law "to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law - that is, to the extent that it stands as an obstacle to the ... full
purposes and objectives of Congress").
54. Id. at 476. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued
that in choice-of-law clauses parties select the law of a state over the law of other states, not the
law of a state over the law of the federal government. Id. at 488 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Brennan believed that the California Court of Appeals had erroneously interpreted the
arbitration agreement to exalt California law above federal law. Id. at 488-90 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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B. State Law Bans On Arbitral Punitive Awards
The perceived clash between state and federal law on the issue of
the availability of punitive damages in arbitration originated with the
landmark case Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.55 There, an author sued her
publisher for breach of contract and intentional torts.56 Based on an
arbitration agreement, the publisher moved successfully to stay the
suits and compel arbitration.5 7 The issue was whether the arbitrator
had authority to award punitive damages.58 Chief Judge Breitel, writ-
ing for a divided court, announced: "An arbitrator has no power to
award punitive damages, even if agreed upon by the parties. '59 The
court justified this rule on public policy grounds. 60 Punishment is a
function of the state.61 An arbitrator, by awarding punitive damages,
encroaches on the state's authority.62 Private parties, even by design,
may not delegate this exclusive state function to a nonjudicial forum. 63
Chief Judge Breitel noted that "[t]he evil of permitting an arbitrator
whose selection is often restricted or manipulatable by the party in a
superior bargaining position, to award punitive damages is that it dis-
places the court and the jury, and therefore the State, as the engine for
imposing a social sanction." 64
The Court relied, too, on a more practical rationale. Unlike court
decisions, which are subject to rigorous appellate review, arbitral deci-
sions are substantially immune to reversal.65 Thus, the court reasoned
that "[i]f arbitrators were allowed to impose punitive damages, the
usefulness of arbitration would be destroyed. It would become a trap
for the unwary given the eminently desirable freedom from judicial
overview of law and facts." 66
55. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
56. Id. at 794.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 796.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Judge Gabrielli dissented, seeing no countervailing policy sufficient to overcome the
policy favoring arbitration, which implies the availability of punitive damages. Id. at 799
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting). Nor could he distinguish Garrity from federal appellate court prece-
dent that sustained treble liquidated damages, a penal award. Id. at 799-800 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 45:65
1995] PROTECTED RIGHT OR SACRED RITE
Garrity thus forbids arbitrators from awarding punitive damages,
even with the consent of the parties.67 The FAA, on the other hand,
favors the liberal interpretation of arbitration agreements, 68 a policy
which arguably conflicts with Garrity. This potential incompatibility
has been the focus of considerable judicial attention.
C. Federal Court Decisions on Punitive Damages
As noted above, even before Mastrobuono, most federal circuit
courts held that the FAA preempts the Garrity rule.69 For example, in
Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc.70 , Automated Busi-
ness Systems commenced an arbitration against Raytheon for inten-
tional torts and breach of an exclusive dealership agreement. 71 The
arbitration clause, which adopted the provisions of the AAA, con-
tained a California choice-of-law clause.72 After a lengthy hearing,
Automated Business Systems received a substantial award of punitive
damages.73 Raytheon moved in federal court to vacate the punitive
award, arguing that California followed the Garrity rule; therefore,
the arbitrators had exceeded their authority.74
The Raytheon court not only questioned whether the Garrity rule
was California law, but also disapproved of the rule.75 The court
67. Id. at 796. The Garrity rule has elicited vigorous criticism. See Richard P. Hackett, Puni-
tive Damages in Arbitration: The Search For A Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272, 300
(1978) (criticizing Garrity as unworkable because arbitration awards do not distinguish between
compensatory and punitive damages); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REV. 953, 959 (1986) (lambasting Garrity as
"an anomaly, frustrating the goals of fairness and finality that are the essence of arbitration and
undermining the valuable role that punitive damages play in deterring fraudulent or malicious
conduct").
68. See supra note 5 (citing cases in which courts have interpreted the FAA as embodying a
liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration agreements).
69. Many commentators agree with this position. See, e.g., Michael L. Collier, Punitive Dam-
ages in Arbitration: The Second Circuit on a Collision Course with the U.S. Supreme Court, 8
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsoL 385, 399 (1993) (contending that federal policy permits arbitral
awards of punitive damages unless the parties expressly agree to exclude this remedy); Anthony
M. Sabino, Awarding Punitive Damages in Securities Industry Arbitration: Working for a Just
Result, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 33, 63 (1992) (urging that a choice-of-law clause incorporates federal
arbitration policy into an agreement, superseding state law exclusions of punitive damages);
Ware supra note 14, at 548 (concluding that Garrity conflicts with the FAA). But see Douglas R.
Davis, supra note 32, at 710-11 (stating that the parties' intent, which excludes punitive damages
absent an express provision to the contrary, should be honored); Kenneth R. Davis, supra note
26, at 94 (arguing that the Garrity rule does not conflict with the FAA because the FAA is silent
on the issue of punitive damages).
70. 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id.
73. Id. The court awarded Automated $ 250,000 in punitive damages. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 11.
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stated that since the arbitral tribunal substitutes for the courtroom,
arbitrators should have powers commensurate with judges. 76 Disin-
clined to enforce the Garrity rule under any circumstances, the court
held that, given a broad arbitration clause and an AAA rule which
permits the arbitrator to grant "any remedy or relief ... within the
scope of the agreement of the parties," the liberal federal policy
tipped the scales in favor of allowing punitive damages. 77
Relegating its discussion of Volt to a footnote, the court attempted
to distinguish that important case on the ground that Volt dealt with a
procedural question, a stay of arbitration, whereas Raytheon dealt
with a substantive matter, the availability of punitive damages.78 The
court, however, failed to justify its belief that Garrity violates federal
policy.79
Some circuit courts have applied the Garrity rule.80 The Seventh
Circuit in Mastrobuono, for example, found no tension between Gar-
rity and the FAA.81 The court's analysis, however, did not withstand
the review of the Supreme Court.
II. MASTROBUONO v. SHEARSON LEHMAN HUTTON, INC.
A. Facts and Procedural Background
In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. ,82 the United
States Supreme Court held that an NASD arbitration panel was em-
powered to award punitive damages, although the parties had agreed
to be governed by New York law which, under the Garrity rule, pro-
hibits such awards.83 The Mastrobuonos, who had a securities trading
account with Shearson, brought an action against the firm under state
and federal law for mishandling the account.84 Based on the client
76. Id. at 12.
77. Id. at 11.
78. Id. at 11-12.
79. Id. at 12. Raytheon has elicited substantial commentary. See Douglas R. Davis, supra
note 32, at 705 (suggesting that the court should have directed the arbitrator to determine, prior
to the hearing, whether he had authority to award punitive damages); James Hadden, The Au-
thority of Arbitrators to Award Punitive Damages: Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys-
tems, 7 J. Disp. RESOL. 337, 350 (1992) (arguing that Raytheon is distinguishable from Garrity
and favoring the availability of punitive awards in arbitration).
80. For example, the Second Circuit in Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. honored a
New York choice-of-law clause in an arbitration agreement, thus vacating an arbitral award of
punitive damages. 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991).
81. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 716-17 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995).
82. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
83. Id. at 1218.
84. Id. at 1214.
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agreement which contained an arbitration clause, Shearson success-
fully moved to compel arbitration. 5 In addition to a substantial com-
pensatory award, the arbitration panel awarded the Mastrobuonos
$400,000 in punitive damages. 86 Seeking to vacate the punitive award,
Shearson argued that the parties' agreement contained a New York
choice-of-law clause and, since New York law forbids arbitrators from
awarding punitive damages, the arbitrators exceeded their authority.87
The district court found this argument persuasive and vacated the
punitive award. 88 In affirming the vacatur, the Seventh Circuit held
that the intent of the parties determined the availability of punitive
damages, and that the choice-of-law clause manifested their intent to
foreclose punitive awards.89 The court rejected Shearson's argument
that the FAA, which favors the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments, preempts any state law limitation of punitive damages.90 The
court stated:
[T]he policy favoring arbitrability applies with less force when there
are doubts concerning the availability of punitive remedies - as
opposed to the "scope of arbitrable issues" ..... Just as the FAA
does not favor or disfavor arbitration under a given set of proce-
dural rules, neither does it favor or disfavor any particular type of
remedy.91
Despite this cogent reasoning, the Supreme Court reversed the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision.92
B. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court began its analysis by remarking that the
"FAA's pro-arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the
wishes of the contracting parties. '93 This tepid recasting of the
Court's vigorous announcement in Volt that the "FAA's primary pur-
pose" is to insure that arbitration agreements "are enforced according
to their terms"94 suggested the Mastrobuono court's desire to distance
itself from Volt. The Court acknowledged in Mastrobuono, however,
85. Id. at 1215.
86. Id
87. Id.
88. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 845, 848-49 (N.D. III. 1993),
aff'd, 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
89. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115
S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
90. Id. at 716-17.
91. Id. at 718 (citations omitted).
92. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
93. Id. at 1216.
94. 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
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as it did in Volt, that resolution of the issue hinged on whether the
arbitration agreement evidenced the parties' intent to permit punitive
damages.95
Demonstrating uncanny facility, the Court uncovered provisions in
the agreement which in its view demonstrated the parties' intent to
permit punitive damages. 96 The Court observed that the agreement
authorized arbitration under NASD rules.97 Although paragraph
3741(e) of the NASD rules merely directs the arbitrators to summa-
rize the relief granted and does not expressly authorize them to
award punitive damages, the Court extracted an implicit grant of au-
thority from this procedural provision.98 The Court relied also on an
unofficial manual provided to NASD arbitrators which instructs that
"[p]arties to arbitration are informed that arbitrators can consider pu-
nitive damages as a remedy." 99 This manual, however, was not incor-
porated into the arbitration agreement. 100 Nevertheless, the Court
relied on paragraph 3741(e) and the Manual to conclude, however
speciously, that the parties intended to permit punitive awards.' 0'
To defuse the choice-of-law clause, the Court noted that, absent the
clause, New York law would presumably have applied if the parties
had signed and executed the agreement in New York. 0 2 Since no
contractual intent could be gleaned in the absence of such a clause,
the Court concluded that no contractual intent could be ascertained
95. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1216.
96. Id. at 1216-17 n.2.
97. Id. at 1218 n.5.
98. Id. at 1218.
99. Id. The Arbitrator's Manual was developed by the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration (SICA), a trade association. Katsoris, supra note 18, at 580-81. Established in 1977,
SICA has also promulgated a Uniform Code of Arbitration which has served as a model for
securities SROs. Id. at 580. The Arbitrator's Manual instructs:
The issue of punitive damages may arise with great frequency in arbitration. Parties to
arbitration are informed that arbitrators can consider punitive damages as a remedy.
Generally, in court proceedings, punitive damages consist of compensation in excess of
actual damages and are awarded as a form of punishment against the wrongdoer. If
punitive damages are awarded, the decision of the arbitrators should clearly specify
what portion of the award is intended as punitive damages, and the arbitrators should
consider referring to the authority on which they relied.
SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 26-27
(1992). This document is presented to new NASD arbitrators while attending a mandatory train-
ing session which is a pre-requisite to participating as an arbitrator. NASD Training Session
administered by Thomas F. Wynn, Assistant Director of Arbitration, NASD (June 28, 1995). As
one might expect in the wake of Mastrobuono, the NASD advises its arbitrators that they may,
in their discretion, award punitive damages. Id.
100. Id. at 1222 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1218.
102. Id. at 1217.
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from the inclusion of such a clause.10 3 This circular argument ignores
the parties' contractual intent to be bound by New York law, including
the Garrity rule. Perhaps recognizing the deficiency of its argument,
the Court suggested alternatively that the choice-of-law clause might
refer only to New York's substantive rights and obligations rather
than to decisional law that allocates authority between tribunals. 104
Such an arbitrary limitation on the effect of the choice-of-law clause
contradicts its broad, unqualified language and cannot, as Justice
Thomas recognized, be reconciled with Volt.105 In sum, the Court pro-
posed two reasons for concluding that the choice-of-law clause did not
include New York's common law prohibition of punitive damages,
neither of which withstands scrutiny.
The Court conceded, however, that the choice-of-law clause may
introduce an ambiguity into the arbitration agreement.106 To support
its refusal to enforce the choice-of-law clause, the Court reverted to a
skewed version of federal arbitration policy, deemphasizing party in-
tent and noting that ambiguities in the scope of the agreement must
be resolved in favor of arbitrability.10 7
After justifying its decision on this reformulation of federal arbitra-
tion policy, the Court attempted to buttress its position using princi-
ples of contract construction and interpretation. 10 8 It relied on the
common law rule that contractual ambiguity is resolved against the
drafting party, reasoning that any ambiguity as to the availability of
punitive damages should be construed against Shearson, which re-
quired the Mastrobuonos to sign a form client agreement.1°9 The
Court concluded its analysis by invoking the principle that a court
must interpret a contract to give effect to all its provisions and harmo-
nize them as much as possible. 1 0 To achieve harmony in this case, the
Court interpreted the choice-of-law clause to apply only to New York
substantive law, not to decisional law limiting the authority of arbitra-
tors."' A more resonant harmony would have been sounded by inter-
preting the choice-of-law clause to prohibit punitive damages, in
accordance with express New York decisional law, and interpreting
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1219.
105. Id. at 1221 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1218.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1219.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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the vague rules of the NASD, which say nothing about punitive dam-
ages,112 to authorize awards of compensatory damages only.
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas dissented."13 He found Mastrobuono indistinguish-
able from Volt, where the Court enforced a statutory stay of arbitra-
tion, upholding state law " 'governing the conduct of arbitration.' "1114
Justice Thomas explained that the Mastrobuono majority, without any
rationale to distinguish Volt, refused to enforce functionally
equivalent state law prohibiting punitive damages."15 Pointing out
that Volt makes no distinction between rules that allocate power and
rules that achieve other objectives, Justice Thomas observed that the
California procedural rule enforced in Volt may be characterized as
one that allocates power between the courts and the arbitral forum,
since it stays arbitration pending judicial resolution.1 6
Arguing that the parties' intent, as expressed in the arbitration
agreement, should be followed, Justice Thomas scrutinized the rele-
vant NASD rules and manual provisions."17 He recognized that para-
graph 3741(e) of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure does not
grant or delimit arbitrator authority; "it merely describes the form in
which the arbitrators must announce their decision.""118 Justice
Thomas asserted that the NASD never officially adopted the manual
on which the majority relied.119 Nor did the parties agree to be bound
by it.120 Justice Thomas argued also that the manual obligates the ar-
bitrator to follow whatever rules the parties designate.' 2' The parties,
through the choice-of-law clause, adopted the New York rule, which
112. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (describing the relevant NASD arbitration
rule).
113. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
114. Id. at 1220 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)). The Volt Court said: "Interpreting a
choice-of-law clause to make applicable state rules governing the conduct of arbitration - rules
which are manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process - simply does not
offend the rule of liberal construction set forth in Moses H. Cone [Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)], nor does it offend any other policy embodied in the FAA."
489 U.S. at 476.
115. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1220 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1221 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1221-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1221 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (interpreting § 41(e) of the Code of Arbitration
Procedures).
119. Id. at 1222 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He noted that SICA published the manual. Id.
120. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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prohibits arbitral punitive awards.122 On the other hand, the NASD
rules are silent on the issue of punitive damages. Even if one stretches
them to otherwise allow punitive awards, the choice-of-law clause
evinces the unmistakable intent to prohibit punitive damages and thus
overrides vaguely contrary NASD rules.' 23
III. A CRITIQUE OF MASTROBUONO
The Mastrobuono Court's analysis foundered in two respects. First,
the Court misapplied contract principles. Second, federal preemption
crept into the Court's rationale, although such reasoning is inimical to
the contract analysis that Volt requires. The Court held that "when a
court interprets [choice-of-law clauses] in an agreement covered by
the FAA, 'due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring
arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause
itself resolved in favor of arbitration.' "'124 Although this pronounce-
ment may not seem controversial, it has troublesome implications.
A. Faulty Contract Analysis
In ruling that liberal federal arbitration policy must be considered in
determining contractual meaning when intent is unclear,125 the Mas-
trobuono Court failed to appreciate that contract analysis is, as
equipped to resolve the ambiguities in arbitration agreements as it is
to resolve the ambiguities in other agreements. The legal meaning of
nearly all agreements may be ascertained by applying common law
rules of interpretation. The principles are well established. In cases of
contract ambiguity, the court will adopt the interpretation that most
successfully harmonizes the various terms. 126 Specific rather than gen-
eral terms control; the express overrides the implied. 27 In rare cases
122. Id. at 1220 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 1222-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1218 (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)).
125. Id.
126. See ARTHUR L. CoRB N, CoRBaIN ON CONTRACTS § 545-54, at 521 (one vol. ed. 1952)
("Provisions in a contract that appear to be controlling or repugnant can frequently be harmo-
nized by reasonable interpretation."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.11, at 263-64 (2d
ed. 1990) ("[A]n interpretation that gives meaning to the entire agreement is favored over that
one that makes some part of it mere surplusage."); SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CON-
TRACTS § 619, at 731 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961) ("The court will if possible give effect
to all parts of the instrument and an interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning to all its
provisions will be preferred to one which leaves a portion of the writing useless or
inexplicable.").
127. See Goldberg v. Bear Steams & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1421 (11th Cir. 1990) ("When general
propositions in a contract are qualified by the specific provisions, the rule of construction is that
the specific provisions in the agreement control."); CoRIan, supra note 126, §§ 545-54, at 521
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where these and other rules fail to resolve ambiguities (Mastrobuono
is not such a case), the court will hear parol evidence. 128 Ties do not
exist in matters of contract interpretation.
In holding that punitive damages may be awarded, the Mas-
trobuono Court relied substantially on the rule that a contract must be
interpreted against the party who drafted it.129 However, this princi-
ple of construction, known as contra proferentum, is applied only
when rules of interpretation, which focus on party intent, fail to untan-
gle contractual ambiguity. 130 The Court should not have resorted to
this principle, because, through the choice-of-law clause, the parties
demonstrated their intent to be governed by the Garrity rule.
A New York choice-of-law clause says: "The agreement shall be
governed by the laws of the State of New York." Such a clause incor-
porates the Garrity rule into the agreement. Garrity expresses an em-
phatic rule of public policy prohibiting arbitrators from awarding
punitive damages. Contrary contractual intent must be strong and un-
equivocal to override it. Only an express provision allowing punitive
awards supersedes such a choice-of-law clause. Arguably, neither the
vague NASD rule nor the arbitrator's manual provision cited by the
("[W]ords of general description should generally yield to words that are more specific.");
FARNSWORTH, supra note 126, § 7.11, at 264 ("[I]t is assumed that the more specific the provi-
sion, the more likely it is to reflect the parties' intention. Accordingly, a specific provision con-
trols a general one and may operate as an exception to it."); WILLISTON, supra note 126, § 619, at
743 ("Where there is a repugnancy between general clauses and specific ones, the latter will
govern.").
128. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 126, § 7.12, at 269 ("It has already been stated that in
interpreting a contract, a court should be free to look to all the relevant circumstances .... All
courts agree that the parol evidence rule permits them to do this."); WILLISTON, supra note 126,
§ 631, at 954 (citing Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clark & F (Eng.) 355, for the proposition that parole
evidence may not be introduced to demonstrate the parties' intent where the language of the
contract is unambiguous and where external circumstances leave no doubt as to its meaning).
129. 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONmACrS § 206 (1979)
(stating that where one party chooses the terms of the contract, he is likely to provide more
carefully for the protection of his own interests than those of the other party; thus, in choosing
among reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement, the meaning which operates against the
drafting party is generally preferred).
130. Professor Corbin characterizes contra proferentum as a rule of last resort:
After applying all the ordinary processes of interpretation, including all existing usages,
general, local, technical, trade, and the custom and agreement of the two parties with
each other, having admitted in evidence and duly weighed all the relevant circum-
stances and communications between the parties, there may still be doubt as to the
meaning that should be given and made effective by the court. [Only under these cir-
cumstances,] the court will adopt [the meaning] which is the less favorable in its legal
effect to the party who chose the words.
CoRBN, supra note 126, § 559, at 527.
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Mastrobuono majority even raise an ambiguity regarding the availa-
bility of punitive damages. 131
Assuming for the sake of argument that the relevant NASD rule
and manual provision create an ambiguity in the Mastrobuono arbitra-
tion agreement, one may resolve this conflict simply by applying the
principle that where a specific contractual provision clashes with a
more general one, the specific provision controls. While the Garrity
rule expressly repudiates the availability of punitive damages in arbi-
tration, the applicable NASD rule and arbitrator's manual provision
are more general, not expressly authorizing the arbitrator to award
punitive damages. 132 At most, they empower the arbitrator to award
punitive damages by vague implication.133 The more specific, express
rule - the Garrity exclusion of punitive damages - should prevail.
Even the broad arbitration clause in Mastrobuono does not change
this result. The clause made "any controversy" arising out of the
transactions between the parties arbitrable. 134 Although a dispute
over whether punitive damages are available can arguably be inter-
preted as a "controversy" arising out of the transactions between the
parties, the arbitration clause is a general provision merely implying
that the arbitrators may award punitive damages. Again, the princi-
ples of contract interpretation outlined above require that the more
specific Garrity rule control.
B. The Misinterpretation of Federal Arbitration Policy
The touchstone of federal arbitration policy is to give effect to the
intent of the parties as expressed in the arbitration agreement, even if
the intent is to limit the scope of arbitrable issues. Federal policy does
not force parties to arbitrate issues against their will. Indeed, the
FAA, which promotes the enforceability of arbitration agreements, is
satisfied when a dispute reaches the arbitral forum. The House Re-
port on the bill destined to become the FAA stated that the purpose
of the bill was to place "[a]n arbitration agreement upon the same
131. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text (explaining that the NASD rules are
silent on the issue of punitive damages).
132. Rule 21(0(4) of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice provides in part that "[n]o agreement
shall include any condition which limits... the ability of the arbitrators to make any award."
RutEs OF FAIR PAcncE ART. III, § 21(f)(4), reprinted in National Association of Securities
Dealers Manual (CCH) 2171 (Apr. 1992). This rule, which became effective after the Mas-
trobuono agreement was executed, was therefore inapplicable to the case.
133. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (explaining that the NASD rules do not ex-
pressly grant arbitrators the authority to award punitive damages).
134. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1995).
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footing as other contracts."'1 35 Similarly, Congressman Graham, a
proponent of the bill, explained that it "does not involve any new
principle of law except to provide a simple method... in order to give
enforcement."1 36
Volt correctly interprets the FAA, allowing state procedures to ap-
ply to arbitration and allowing state substantive law, consistent with
the FAA, to govern arbitration. 37 Garrity's prohibition of arbitral pu-
nitive awards is a rule of substantive law, and, since the FAA does not
address the availability of such awards, Garrity is not preempted. 38
Mastrobuono misapplied federal policy and spawned a murky rule.
The Court's rationale for not enforcing the Garrity rule is unclear.
The Court did not hold that the FAA absolutely preempts the Garrity
rule.139 Such a holding would reject Garrity without qualification.
Rather, the Court adopted a limited form of preemption which, in
essence, transformed federal policy into a rule of contract construction
to be considered with the ordinary rules of contract interpretation. 40
Federal policy, held the court, weighs on the side of construing an
arbitration agreement broadly. This limited version of federal pre-
emption engenders confusion because the Court did not articulate the
force of federal policy as a rule of contract construction. More funda-
mentally, such a delineation is impossible because every situation
presents a unique set of interpretive problems. Thus, rather than rul-
ing that Garrity is not preempted (the correct result) or that Garrity is
135. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924). See supra notes 32-37 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the purpose of the FAA to overcome the hesitancy of state courts to enforce
arbitration agreements).
136. 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924).
137. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 476-77 (1989).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40 (discussing the provisions of the FAA and ex-
plaining that they supersede state law) and text accompanying notes 55-68 (discussing the court's
decision in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976)).
139. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1216-17 (1995) (sug-
gesting that the FAA would not preempt the Garrity rule where the parties expressly provide in
their written arbitration agreement that punitive damages may not be awarded).
140. Although often used interchangeably, contract interpretation and construction are not
synonymous. "Interpretation" refers to the meaning the parties intended to convey by the lan-
guage used; "construction" refers to the process affixing legal effect to a contract by operation of
law, regardless of party intent. CoRIN, supra note 126, § 534, at 492; FARNswoRTH, supra note
126, § 7.7, at 237 ; WILLISTON, supra note 126, § 602, at 320. As Williston explains:
The word "interpretation" is used with respect to language itself; it is the process of
applying the legal standard to expressions found in the agreement in order to deter-
mine their meaning. "Construction," on the other hand, is used to determine, not the
sense of words or symbols, but the legal meaning of the entire contract; the word is
rightly used wherever the import of the writing is made to depend on a special sense
imposed by law.
WILLISTON, supra note 126, § 602, at 320.
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preempted (at least a clear result), the court created an ill-defined,
"relative" level of preemption, which merely strengthens, to an inde-
terminable extent, contract provisions broadening the arbitration
agreement.
Contract law provides the tools to ascertain the meaning of ambigu-
ous contracts. The Supreme Court's oft-quoted statement that "ambi-
guities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself [are] resolved in
favor of arbitration, ' 141 although impressionistically correct, has bred
a preemption rule which does not consider intent as manifested by the
agreement. Thus, the statement may point away from the meaning
that principles of contract interpretation would cast on an ambiguous
agreement. Such a preemption rule may, at times, contradict the cen-
tral purpose of the FAA - to honor the written agreement.
IV. Ti IMPLICATIONS OF MASTROBUONO
By injecting preemption principles into the contract analysis, the
Mastrobuono Court undermined the federal policy of enforcing arbi-
tration agreements according to their terms. Swayed by Mastrobuono,
courts, in close cases, may defer to the preemption rule of broadly
interpreting arbitration agreements, thereby defeating the contractual
intent as expressed in the arbitration agreement.
Two issues raise the potential conflict between federal arbitration
policy, as expressed in Mastrobuono, and state law. The first is
whether federal policy preempts state law that delegates to the court,
rather than the arbitrator, questions of time limitations. 142 The sec-
ond issue is whether federal policy preempts state law disallowing ar-
bitrators from awarding attorneys' fees.143
A. Statutes of Limitations
The reflex of many federal judges to rule in favor of arbitrability
suggests that when chosen state law in any way limits the powers of
arbitrators, the weight of preemption, taken in tandem with other con-
tractual provisions, will be just enough to reject chosen state law. One
inevitable victim of Mastrobuono is the New York rule empowering
the court to decide arbitral statute of limitations questions.
141. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 476 (1989) cited in Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1218).
142. See infra notes 144-205 (discussing statutes of limitations).
143. See infra notes 206-235 (discussing attorneys' fees).
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1. Cases Preceding Mastrobuono
Only two weeks before the Mastrobuono decision, the New York
Court of Appeals held in Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v.
Luckie144 that the court, rather than the arbitrator, should decide
whether a statute of limitations time-bars arbitration. 145 In Luckie,
Kahn commenced arbitration against Smith Barney, a securities bro-
ker-dealer, alleging fraud and account mismanagement. 146 The cus-
tomer agreement provided that "[a]ny controversy" relating to the
contract between the parties would be arbitrated. 147 The agreement
included a New York choice-of-law clause providing that New York
law would govern "[t]his agreement and its enforcement."' 148 Smith
Barney moved in New York Supreme Court to stay arbitration, argu-
ing that the claims were time-barred. 149
Holding that the arbitration was timely filed, the New York
Supreme Court denied the petition.'50 The Appellate Division af-
firmed the denial of the stay on other grounds.' 5' It noted that the
arbitration clause applied to "any controversy" and that a dispute
over the timeliness of the arbitration is itself a "controversy" under
the agreement. 152 Thus, the Appellate Division ruled that, in keeping
with the liberal policy of the FAA, the timeliness issue was for the
arbitrator, not the court, to decide. 153
144. 647 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).
145. Id. at 1310. In the companion case to Luckie, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Manhard, 647 N.E.2d 1308 (1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1995), Merrill
Lynch moved to stay arbitration, arguing that it was barred by Section 15 of the NASD Code of
Arbitration Procedure, state and federal statutes of limitations, and New York's borrowing stat-
ute. Id. at 1311. Manhard conceded that the NASD rule barred certain of her claims, but argued
in her motion that the other timeliness issues were for the arbitrator to decide. Id. at 1311-12.
The New York Supreme Court disagreed and decided the motion adversely to Manhard. Id. at
1312. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed on the ground that the statute of limitations
issues were, as a result of federal policy, arbitrable issues. Id.
146. Id. at 1310-11.
147. Id. at 1310.
148. Id. at 1311.
149. Id. C.P.L.R. 7502(b) provides in part:
If, at the time that a demand for arbitration was made or a notice of intention to arbi-
trate was served, the claim sought to be arbitrated would have been barred by limita-
tion of time had it been asserted in a court of the state, a party may assert the limitation
as a bar to the arbitration on an application to the court as provided in section 7503 or
subdivision (b) of section 7511. The failure to assert such bar by such application shall
not preclude its assertion before the arbitrators, who may, in their sole discretion, apply
or not apply the bar.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 7502(b) (McKinney 1980).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals began by analyzing the
contractual intent of the parties. It noted that, although the parties
agreed to submit "any controversy" under the agreement to arbitra-
tion, they selected New York law to govern the enforcement of the
agreement.154 Since statute of limitations issues involve enforcement,
such issues must be determined by the forum designated under New
York law.155 As noted, New York law authorizes the court to decide
whether statutes of limitations bar arbitration. 5 6
After ascertaining the intent of the parties, the court explained that
it must next determine if the FAA preempts the New York rule,
although the parties incorporated this rule into their contract by oper-
ation of the choice-of-law clause.157 To resolve this issue, the court
reviewed Volt and concluded that federal law honors the parties'
choice of law unless "'the chosen law creates a conflict with the terms
of, or the policies underlying, the FAA.' "158 Presented with no ex-
press provision of the FAA conflicting with the New York rule, the
court focused on whether the New York rule undermines the policies
of the FAA.' 59 Again citing Volt, the court stressed that the state's
arbitration law is consistent with the FAA, "'even if the result is that
arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go
forward.' "160 The court reasoned that by sustaining the parties'
choice of law it was advancing the federal policy of " 'ensur[ing] the
enforceability according to their terms, of private agreements to arbi-
trate.' ",161 The court recognized that federal policy and contractual
intent are inseparable. Federal policy, above all else, promotes free-
dom of contract.162 To reinforce its holding, the court observed that
the FAA was modeled after New York arbitration law.' 63 The policies
154. Id. at 1313.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 409 N.E.2d 951, 954 (1980)); see N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. 7502(b) (McKinney 1980) (stating a party may assert a time limitation as a bar to
the arbitration upon application to the court).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1312 (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)).
159. Id. at 1313-14.
160. Id. at 1315 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).
161. Id. at 1316 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 476).
162. Id. Chief Justice Kaye concurred. Id. (Kaye, J., concurring). Although agreeing with the
court's reading of Volt, she questioned the wisdom of imposing of New York law on Florida and
Virginia residents, who, despite having agreed to arbitrate, never reached the arbitral forum. Id.
(Kaye, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 1315 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 n.13
(1967)).
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of federal arbitration law are therefore consistent with New York arbi-
tration policy. 164
Smith Barney sought to distinguish Volt on the ground that Volt in-
volved a temporary stay of arbitration, whereas Luckie potentially in-
volved a permanent stay.165 The court rejected this argument because
the holding in Volt expressed no such qualification. 166
Several cases, contrary to Luckie, instruct that the FAA preempts
the New York statute of limitations rule. 167 Such a holding was im-
plicit in Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner,168 where the Sec-
ond Circuit ruled that the arbitrator decides statute of limitations
questions. 169 In Wagoner, the parties arbitrated a churning claim
under an agreement "to refer all disputes arising out of a contract to
arbitration," while selecting New York law to govern disputes. 70 The
court concluded that "any limitations defense - whether stemming
from the arbitration agreement, arbitration association rule, 171 or state
164. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308, 1315 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1995).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. E.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shaddock, 822 F. Supp. 125, 136
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (refusing to find that the choice-of-law provision at issue required application of
New York law in place of federal arbitration law); Victor v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 606 So.
2d 681, 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the FAA preempts the application of New
York law granting the court the authority to decide statute of limitations issues); see Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversing a district court
decision holding that an arbitration was time-barred because, "when the contract contains a
'broad' arbitration clause ... that purports 'to refer all disputes arising out of a contract to
arbitration,' the strong presumption in favor of arbitrability applies with even greater force").
168. 944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991).
169. Id. at 120-22.
170. Id. at 121.
171. The Wagoner court was referring to arbitration association rules limiting the time in
which a party may commence arbitration. E.g., NASD CODE OF PROCEDURES § 15; NYSE
RULE 603 (both requiring arbitration to be commenced within six years of the event giving rise
to the dispute). Some courts have interpreted New York law to authorize New York courts to
decide whether an association rule time-bars an arbitration. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. DeChaine, 600 N.Y.S. 2d 459, 460 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993), appeal denied, 624
N.E. 2d 694 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that NYSE Rule 603 time-bars an arbitration); Prudential Bach
Securities v. Archard, 579 N.Y.S.2d 890, 891 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1992), appeal denied, 600
N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that NASD code § 15 time-bars an arbitration). The issue then
arises whether the FAA preempts the New York rule and empowers arbitrators to decide if an
association rule time-bars an arbitration. Most federal courts hold that the FAA does preempt
the New York rule, although these courts are split over whether the federal courts or the arbitra-
tors should decide if the arbitration is time-barred. Compare Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith v. Masland, 878 F. Supp. 710, 712 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that the FAA preempts New
York law, which presumably authorizes the state court to resolve the issue, and that, since NASD
Code § 15 is an "eligibility" requirement and therefore jurisdictional, the federal court decides
whether that section time-bars arbitration) with Painewebber, Inc. v. Landay, No. 94-10957 WL
598205, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1995) (holding that the FAA preempts New York law and that
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statute - is an issue to be addressed by the arbitrators.' 72 Though
not expressly invoking federal preemption, the court relied on the
broad arbitration clause and "the strong presumption in favor of arbi-
trability" arising from federal policy.173 Curiously, Volt eluded the
court's analysis.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Shaddock,174 the court,
citing Wagoner, decided the preemption issue directly. 75 It stated
that "at the time the parties entered into the agreement, New York
courts considered choice-of-law provisions in arbitration agreements
to designate only the substantive law to be applied by the arbitrators
and not to displace application of federal arbitration law.' 76 Thus,
the court, dismissing the effect of the choice-of-law clause, reasoned
that the parties did not intend New York arbitration law to apply.177
The court also managed to discount Volt. It found that Volt merely
affirmed the California court's ruling that the parties intended Califor-
nia law to govern. 78 The court then observed that the New York
courts, unlike the California court in Volt, do not exalt chosen state
law above federal policy.179
The Shaddock court's analysis obscures two salient points: (1) Volt
limited the scope of federal preemption to state law conflicting di-
the issue of time limitations under association rules is for the arbitrator to decide) and Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Noonan, No. 92-3770, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11363, at *27-28
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992) (holding that, since NASD Code § 35 empowers arbitrators to interpret
other Code rules, the issue whether NASD Code § 15 time-bars an arbitration is for the arbitra-
tors to decide). Most state courts, on the other hand, hold that the FAA does not preempt New
York law governing the question whether association rules time-bar arbitration. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. DeChaine, 600 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993),
appeal denied, 624 N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting preemption argument). Contra Prudential
Securities Inc. v. Purello, 614 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (holding that the FAA
preempts the application of CPLR 7503 on the issue of whether NASD Code § 15 time-bars
arbitration, particularly in view of NASD Code § 35 which empowers the arbitrator to interpret
other NASD code provisions).
172. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 944 F.2d at 121.
173. Id. The trustee in bankruptcy, who advanced the claim against Shearson, argued unsuc-
cessfully that the arbitration agreement did not include tort as opposed to contract claims. Id. at
121-22.
174. 822 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
175. Id. at 136.
176. Id. Petitioners argued that, since subject matter jurisdiction was based on diversity, the
case was governed by New York law rather than federal law. Id. at 132. The court rejected this
argument, noting that the FAA applies to any case, regardless of the source of subject matter
jurisdiction, if the contract containing the arbitration clause concerns transactions in interstate
commerce. Id.
177. Id. at 134-35.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 133-34.
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rectly with federal arbitration law,180 and (2) generally prevailing state
common law principles of contract interpretation support the applica-
bility of chosen state law barring punitive awards.181 The court's
skewed reading of the choice-of-law clause was even more extreme
than the gloss the United States Supreme Court put on the choice-of-
law clause in Mastrobuono. Unlike Mastrobuono where the High
Court truncated the choice-of-law clause so that it did not encompass
decisional law allocating power between tribunals, 182 the Shaddock
court carved out all arbitration law from the ambit of the choice-of-
law clause.183 The evisceration of the broad choice-of-law clause,
which said that the agreement and its enforcement would be governed
by New York law, showed the court's determination to refer the stat-
ute of limitations issue to the arbitrators, regardless of the terms of the
agreement. 184
2. The Rule After Mastrobuono
It is arguable that Mastrobuono may be limited to its facts and
therefore does not answer the statute of limitations issue. The Court
said that the issue posed was one of contract interpretation. 85 It ra-
tionalized its ruling, in part, on paragraph 3741(e) of the NASD Code
of Arbitration Procedure, which, the majority concluded, empowered
the arbitrator to award "damages and other relief," including punitive
damages.' 86 The court relied also on the NASD arbitrator's manual
which refers to punitive damages.' 87 These provisions have no rele-
vance to statute of limitations issues.
As Justice Thomas optimistically observed in his dissent:
This case amounts to nothing more than a federal court applying
New York and Illinois contract law to an agreement between parties
in Illinois. Much like a federal court applying a rule of decision to a
case when sitting in diversity, the majority's interpretation of the
contract represents only the understanding of a single federal court
regarding the requirements imposed by state law.188
180. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leeland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
476-77 (1989).
181. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (discussing the common law principles of
contract interpretation).
182. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1995).
183. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shaddock, 822 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
184. Id. at 132.
185. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1216.
186. Id. at 1218.
187. Id.
188. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1223 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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Justice Thomas' point is that, should an authoritative New York state
court interpret the contract at issue to bar punitive damages, the
Supreme Court and all other courts would presumably be bound by
that interpretation.' 8 9 Theoretically, Mastrobuono is not binding on
any court because the question of contract interpretation that it ad-
dressed is one of state common law, not federal law. This view strips
Mastrobuono of any meaningful precedential effect. It is unlikely,
however, to take hold in federal courts. 190
If Mastrobuono is narrowly interpreted, Volt may govern the statute
of limitations issue. Volt explained that the FAA does not prevent
"the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules
than [sic] those set forth in the Act itself."'191 Both the issue decided
in Volt and the statute of limitations issue involve procedure rather
than substance. By determining that the parties could agree to proce-
dural rules different from those set forth in the FAA, Volt suggests
that chosen state law may govern the statute of limitations issue.
Thus, the heightened sensitivity to preemption shown in Mastrobuono
may not apply in statute of limitations cases.
One might also distinguish Luckie from Mastrobuono on the lan-
guage of the arbitration clauses those cases interpreted. The arbitra-
tion clause in Luckie provided that New York law would govern "the
agreement and its enforcement."'192 Under New York law, the issue of
whether a statute of limitations has expired is a threshold question of
arbitrability. 93 A threshold question is by definition an "enforce-
189. See Eric Rieder, High Court Decisions Leave Questions Unanswered, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 30,
1995, at 5 (noting that the New York Court of Appeals might, even now, decide the issues
presented in Mastrobuono contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court).
190. Since the Mastrobuono decision, the federal courts have unanimously sustained the arbi-
trability of punitive awards. E.g., Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp., 64 F.3d 993, (5th Cir. 1995) (interpreting Mastrobuono to hold that an arbitrator may
award punitive damages unless the arbitration agreement contains an express prohibition); Da-
vis v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 1995) (relying on Mastrobuono to
sustain punitive award where parties arbitrated under both AAA rules and New York law);
Kelley v. Michaels, 59 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding punitive award on the author-
ity of Mastrobuono); Smith Barney Inc. v. Schell, 53 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing
district court's vacatur of arbitral punitive award on authority of Mastrobuono); Painewebber,
Inc. v. Landay, No. 94-10957, 1995 WL 598205, at *11 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1955) (granting motion
to compel arbitration including the issue of punitive damages); Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc.
v. Neurological Assoc. of Indiana, P.C., 896 F. Supp. 844, (S.D. I(nd. 1995) (following Mas-
trobuono where the arbitration agreement incorporated NASD rules and contained a New York
choice-of law clause); Painewebber, Inc. v. Richardson, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5317, at *9-10
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1995) (confirming punitive award on authority of Mastrobuono).
191. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989).
192. Smith Barney Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308, 1313 (1995).
193. See id. (referring to the statute of limitations issue as a "threshold" question).
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ment" matter, which the parties expressly agreed would be governed
by New York law. In contrast to the arbitration clause in Luckie, the
arbitration clause in Mastrobuono provided that the agreement "shall
be governed by the laws of the State of New York. ' 194 That clause
made no reference to "enforcement." Even if one interprets Mas-
trobuono broadly to hold that the FAA rendered that choice-of law
clause ineffective as to all state law limitations on arbitrator authority,
inclusion of the word "enforcement" in the choice-of-law clause in
Luckie may distinguish it from Mastrobuono.195
It seems, however, that the Mastrobuono Court intended to go far
beyond a ruling limited to the facts of the case. The Court likened a
choice-of-law clause, to a conflict-of-laws rule, ignoring that a choice-
of-law clause reflects contractual intent.196 The Court's flimsy basis
for reversing the Seventh Circuit suggests that it shares the predisposi-
tion, predominant among federal courts, to rule against state law in-
cursions into the authority of arbitrators. The federal judiciary will
undoubtedly seize upon Mastrobuono to reject the reasoning in
Luckie.197 A justification for repudiating a state law rule delegating
statute of limitations issues to the courts is easily at hand when the
parties adopt a broad arbitration clause submitting "any controversy"
to arbitration. A statute of limitations issue may readily be character-
ized as a "controversy" under the agreement. 98 Such a rationale fits
neatly under Mastrobuono, which relied on even less persuasive con-
tract arguments.
The Fourth Circuit followed this reasoning in Community Motors
Property Associates Limited Partnership v. McDevitt Street Bovis,
194. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1215 (1995).
195. See Smith Barney Inc. v. Sacharow, N.Y. L.J., (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) Apr. 19, 1995, at 26 (distin-
guishing Luckie from Mastrobuono on the ground that the choice-of-law clause in Luckie specifi-
cally covered "enforcement" and thus invoked New York arbitration law). But see Painewebber,
Inc. v. Richardson, 94 Civ. 3104, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5317, at *14 n.9 (disapproving of the
reasoning in Sacharow); Robert A. Barker, Arbitration Agreements in Securities Industry Con-
tracts, N.Y. L.J., May 15, 1995, at 3 (questioning the rationale of Sacharow).
196. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1217.
197. After the Supreme Court's Mastrobuono decision, the New York Court of Appeals on
October 13, 1995 denied a motion for reconsideration in Luckie. See SIA Responds to NYSE:
Symposium Recommendations Draw New Punitive Damage Proposal, SEc. ARB. COMMENTA-
TOR, Oct. 1995, at 11. Based exclusively on the argument that Mastrobuono overruled Manhard,
the companion case to Luckie, Manhard sought certiorari. The United States Supreme Court
denied the petition. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manhard, 647 N.E.2d 1308
(N.Y. 1995), cert. denied, U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1995). See SIA Responds to NYSE: Sym-
posium Recommendations Draw New Punitive Damage Proposal SEc. ARB. COMMENTATOR,
Oct. 1995, at 11.
198. See Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114,121 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that the issue whether an arbitration is time-barred is a "dispute" under a broad arbitration
clause).
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Inc.,199 holding that a contested timeliness defense presented a "dis-
pute" within the meaning of a broad arbitration clause.200 Although
the court found that a choice-of-law clause created an ambiguity as to
whether the parties intended the arbitrators or the court to decide the
timeliness issue, it ruled the issue arbitrable in light of federal pol-
icy.201 The court reached this decision without even considering rules
of contract interpretation. Seduced by the presumption of arbi-
trability, the court abandoned dispositive contract principles and ob-
scured the intent of the parties.202 This case illustrates the mischief
inherent in Mastrobuono. Waving the magic wand of federal policy
excuses a careful analysis of what the parties intended.
Chosen state law that allocates power from the arbitral forum to the
courtroom may be defunct after Mastrobuono.20 3 The "allocation of
power" rule, broadly applied, would swallow virtually any state law
infringement on an arbitrator's authority. Like Garrity, the New York
statute of limitations rule allocates power to the courts. Sustaining a
statute of limitations defense terminates an arbitration, resulting in a
permanent stay rather than the temporary stay upheld in Volt. Courts
may, therefore, be more inclined, in statute of limitations cases, to
apply the Mastrobuono rationale than the Volt holding. Even the Cal-
ifornia procedure sustained in Volt might not survive Mastrobuono's
"allocation of power" analysis.
Mastrobuono arguably reshapes federal arbitration policy. Apply-
ing a distorted view of the FAA, the Mastrobuono court constricts the
reach of Volt and elevates the federal policy resolving" 'ambiguities as
to the scope of the arbitration clause . . . in favor of arbitration' "
above the policy that should be preeminent: honoring the terms of
the agreement.2°4 Although the Court sought to protect the freedom
199. No. 94-1949, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15508 (4th Cir. June 22, 1995) (per curiam).
200. Id. at *8-9. The arbitration clause provided that "all claims, disputes and other matters in
question between the [parties] arising out of, or relating to, the contract ... shall be decided by
arbitration .. " Id. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Shaddock, 822 F. Supp.
125, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (construing a clause requiring the arbitration of "any controversy"
arising from the parties' securities brokerage agreement to encompass a dispute over compliance
with a statute of limitations).
201. Id. at *10-11 (citing Moses H. Cohen Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1983)).
202. Ironically, the court cited Mastrobuono for the proposition that "the intention of the
parties as expressed in their contract determines whether the arbitrators or the court should
resolve the timeliness issue." Id. at *8.
203. The Court's reference to "decisional" law would not appear to be significant. Mas-
trobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1995). The same rule would
seem to apply to state statutory law.
204. 115 S. Ct. at 1218 (quoting Moses H. Cohen Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
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to enter into arbitration agreements, it limited that freedom by dis-
counting a choice-of-law provision.
B. Attorneys' Fees
New York law prohibits arbitrators from awarding attorneys' fees
unless the agreement expressly grants this authority to the arbitra-
tor.205 If the parties agree to arbitrate subject to New York law, appli-
cation of the New York rule would, in most instances, preclude such
relief. On the other hand, liberal federal arbitration policy arguably
permits arbitral awards of attorneys' fees.206 The issue is whether fed-
eral policy, in conjunction with a broad arbitration clause, preempts a
state law restriction on such awards. Before Mastrobuono, there was
authority for207 and against this preemption argument.208
205. CPLR 7513 provides in pertinent part: "Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to
arbitrate, the arbitrator's expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including attor-
neys'fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award. N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 7513 (McKinney 1980). Although the New York Court of Appeals has never
ruled on this issue, the Appellate Divisions that have confronted the issue are in accord that
arbitrators may award attorneys' fees only if the agreement so provides. E.g., MKC Develop-
ment Corp. v. Weiss, 612 N.Y.S.2d 946, 946-47 (1994) (vacating an arbitral award of attorneys'
fees on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded their powers by making such an award); Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McConachie, N.Y.L.J. (1st Dept. Dec. 22, 1993) at 22
(staying a demand to arbitrate attorneys' fees because the agreement did not confer this power
on the arbitrators). Other jurisdictions similarly restrict arbitrators from awarding attorneys'
fees. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.100 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.11 (West 1989); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 251. § 10 (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.11 (1983).
206. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Inc., 943 F.2d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir. 1991) (artic-
ulating the liberal federal policy supporting arbitral awards of attorney's fees); Delaware Dept.
of Social Servs. v. Department of Educ., 772 F.2d 1123, 1139 (3d Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the
FAA empowers arbitrators to award attorneys' fees). But see Raytheon Co. v. Computer Dis-
tribs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 553, 560 (D. Mass. 1986) (confirming arbitrators' refusal to consider
awarding attorneys' fees under Massachusetts law because the FAA does not contemplate such
awards); Sammi Line Co. v. Altamar Navegacion S.A., 605 F. Supp. 72, 74 (S.D.N.Y 1985) (va-
cating an arbitral award of attorneys' fees because arbitrators do not ordinarily have authority to
grant such relief).
207. See Clarendon Marketing, Inc. v. CT Chemicals, Inc., No. 93-0285, 1993 WL 300041, at
*8 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1993) (stating in dicta that federal law preempts CPLR 7513 which a
choice-of-law clause incorporated into an arbitration agreement); Todd Shipyards Corp. v.
Cunard Line Ltd., 735 F. Supp. 1462, 1467 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 943 F. 2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991)
(stating that federal rather than New York law governs the award of punitive damages in arbitra-
tion matter). For a discussion of Todd Shipyards see infra notes 209-15 and accompanying text.
208. See Smith, Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Johnson, 626 So. 2d 969, 970-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that Florida Arbitration Code § 682.11, which disallows arbitral awards of
attorneys' fees, does not offend the FAA); Raytheon Co. v. Computer Distribs., Inc., 632 F.
Supp. 553, 560 (D. Mass. 1986) (stating parties in a commercial dispute agreed to be governed by
Massachusetts law, and therefore a finding that arbitrators lacked authority to award attorney's
fees did not violate the FAA); Baxter Health Care Corp. v. Harvard Apparatus, Inc., 617 N.E.2d
1018, 1021 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (ordering vacatur of arbitral award of attorneys' fees because
Massachusetts law disallows such awards and the FAA is not to the contrary). For a discussion
of the Raytheon opinion see infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
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1. Cases Preceding Mastrobuono
In Todds Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line Ltd.,209 the court sus-
tained an arbitral award of attorneys' fees against Cunard, despite a
New York choice-of-law clause.2 10 Although the arbitration panel did
not articulate why it had awarded Todd Shipyards attorneys' fees, the
court surmised that the reason was Cunard's bad faith conduct at the
arbitration.211 The panel, the court conjectured further, may have im-
posed the award against Cunard for violating a novel variant of fed-
eral arbitration policy - the punishment of bad faith arbitration
tactics.212 Though unarticulated by the panel, that rationale was suffi-
cient, in the court's view, to preempt the New York rule.213 On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed,214 noting merely that a finding of bad
faith is within the purview of a panel.215 It failed to comment on fed-
eral preemption.
The district court's analysis, endorsed implicitly on appeal, ignored
the source of the panel's powers, the arbitration agreement. Contract
analysis would not have revealed the intent to vest the arbitrators with
the authority to award attorneys' fees. A misapprehension of federal
policy again displaced the intent of the parties.
Unlike the Todd Shipyards court, the district court in Raytheon Co.
v. Computer Distributors, Inc.216 discerned no conflict between federal
arbitration policy and state law restrictions on arbitral awards of attor-
neys' fees.217 Refusing to vacate the arbitrators' determination that
they lacked authority, under chosen Massachusetts law, to award legal
costs, the court found no grant of such authority in the FAA.218
Rather, the court suggested that eliminating the complex issue of at-
torneys' fees served federal policy by facilitating efficiency in
arbitration.219
209. 735 F. Supp. 1462 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 943 F. 2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991).
210. Id. at 1468.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Inc., 943 F.2d 1056, 1065 (9th Cir. 1991).
215. Id. at 1064.
216. 632 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1986).
217. Id. at 560.
218. Id.
219. Id. The court also noted that the parties' choice of Massachusetts law, which precludes
arbitral awards of attorneys' fees, overrode any contrary federal policy. Id. at 559.
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2. The Rule After Mastrobuono
Although Mastrobuono points toward the argument for preemp-
tion, some courts, even after Mastrobuono, have resisted adopting
that position.220 In Painewebber v. Richardson,221 the court applied
the New York attorneys' fees rule to an arbitration, because it found
no conflict between the rule and Mastrobuono.222 Rather than focus-
ing on federal arbitration policy, the court stressed Mastrobuono's re-
liance on the principle that an ambiguous contract should be
construed against the drafting party.223 The court noted that the
Supreme Court sustained the punitive award in Mastrobuono because
customers, in signing standard brokerage account agreements, could
not foresee relinquishing the "important substantive right" 224 to re-
ceive punitive damages. Luckie, the district court reasoned, is consis-
tent with Mastrobuono, because no deprivation of an important
substantive right occurs when the court, rather than the arbitrator, de-
cides a statute of limitations issue.225 The district court concluded that
enforcing the New York attorneys' fees rule does not unforeseeably
result in the waiver of an important substantive right. 226 To distin-
guish. Richardson from Mastrobuono, the court noted that, whereas
litigants are entitled under appropriate circumstances to punitive
damages, they are not ordinarily entitled to attorneys' fees.227 Thus,
arbitrating parties, who might reasonably seek punitive damages,
would not expect attorneys' fees to be an available remedy. 228 Sec-
ond, the court observed that a brokerage customer, if defeated in arbi-
220. See infra notes 221-231 and accompanying text (discussing cases that reject preemption).
221. 94 Civ. 3104, 1995 Dist. LEXIS 5317 (Apr. 20, 1995).
222. Id. at *12.
223. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995).
224. Painewebber, Inc. v. Richardson, No. 94-3104, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5317, at *12 (citing
Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1219).
225. Id. at *13.
226. Id.
227. Id. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,
561 (1985) ("It is well established, under the 'American Rule,' 'the prevailing litigant is ordina-
rily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser.' ") (quoting Alyeska Pipe-
line Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard
Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir. 1991) (articulating the rule that parties should bear their
own attorneys' fees). Courts will sustain the award of counsel fees, however, when the parties'
contract or an applicable statute authorizes such relief. E.g., Eljer Manu Co. v. Kowin Dev.
Corp., 14 F.3d 1250,1257 (7th Cir. 1994) (confirming an arbitral award of attorneys' fees because
statute authorized such relief); Delaware Dept. of Health and Social Servs. v. Department of
Educ., 772 F.2d 1123, 1139 (3d Cir. 1985) (commenting that the American Rule generally pre-
vents the recovery of attorneys' fees absent contractual or statutory authorization).
228. Painewebber, Inc. v. Richardson, No. 94-3104, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5317, at *13.
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tration, would not expect to be saddled with his adversary's attorneys'
fees, a possible outcome if the New York rule were not applied.229
This decision analyzes Mastrobuono through a myopic lens. Re-
gardless of whether Mastrobuono was correct, federal preemption was
central to its rationale. Yet, in discussing Mastrobuono, the Richard-
son court relegated federal preemption to invisibility. The principle of
contra proferentum, generally applied only after rules of contract in-
terpretation fail to resolve an ambiguity,230 emerged, in the district
court's view, as the dispositive rule of Mastrobuono. No other rules of
contract law even warranted mention.
Richardson, despite its shortcomings, has inspired support. 31 Sub-
sequent decisions on the availability of attorneys' fees should consider
federal arbitration law and conclude that state law limitations on arbi-
tral awards of attorneys' fees do not offend federal policy. As co-
gently as one may argue that the FAA takes no position on awards of
punitive damages, one may contend, with even greater assurance, that
the FAA takes no position on awards of attorneys' fees.232 Richard-
son's analysis of contractual intent, though inaptly tied to its over-em-
phasis of contra proferentum, reveals the flaw in the preemption
argument. Federal arbitration policy instructs courts to interpret arbi-
tration agreements in accordance with the intent of the parties. Par-
ties would presumably not intend to confer on arbitrators authority to
award counsel fees when judges do not ordinarily grant such relief.233
Similarly, the drafters of the FAA did not intend to invest arbitrators
with power to grant remedies beyond the scope of judicial authority.
No such express statutory authority appears in the FAA, and only the
most zealous advocates of arbitration would infer such extraordinary
power based on the policy favoring arbitration.
229. Id. at *13-14.
230. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Corbin's characteriza-
tion of contra proferentum).
231. Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Mathes, No. 0126054, 1995 WL 534247, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 1, 1995) (adopting expressly the reasoning of Richardson).
232. The limitation on attorneys' fees is less restrictive than the Garrity rule. Whereas the
Garrity rule bars punitive damages even when the parties expressly agree to confer on the arbi-
trators the authority to grant such relief, Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 796 (N.Y.
1976), CPLR 7513 honors an express agreement to confer on the arbitrators the authority to
grant counsel fees. Civ. PRc. L. & R. 7513 (McKinney 1980). The argument that the FAA
preempts CPLR 7513 is therefore even weaker than the argument that the FAA preempts Gar-
rity. See supra text accompanying notes 135-41 (arguing that the FAA does not preempt
Garrity).
233. This argument does not always apply. For example, in Raytheon Co. v. Computer Dis-
tributors, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 553, 558 (D. Mass. 1986), Massachusetts law would have authorized a
court to award attorneys' fees, had the parties litigated the dispute. Massachusetts law, however,
did not grant commensurate authority to arbitrators hearing the identical claim.
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Even Mastrobuono seems to permit state law restrictions on arbitral
awards of attorneys' fees. Mastrobuono interpreted a choice-of-law
clause to embrace state substantive law excluding special rules allocat-
ing authority from arbitration to the court.234 When state law pre-
cludes courts and arbitrators alike from granting such relief, it is not
allocating power. Rather, such a rule is general substantive law,
which, according to Mastrobuono, is incorporated into an arbitration
agreement by a choice-of-law clause.
CONCLUSION
Federal law preempts state law that refuses to honor arbitration
agreements. 235 However, the state law chosen by arbitrating parties
may, without offending federal law, displace FAA procedures.236 In
areas where the FAA is silent, state law may even impose substantive
limitations on arbitration, such as a ban on punitive damages and at-
torneys fees. The Supreme Court recognized in Volt that the thrust of
federal arbitration policy, as embodied in the FAA, is to enforce arbi-
tration agreements as written, not to compel parties to arbitrate issues
against their will.237 Mastrobuono has converted the benign Supreme
Court dictum that the FAA creates a "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration" 238 into a creed that exalts arbitration as if it were a sacred
rite. The drafters of the FAA had no such intent.2 39 They were com-
batting the judiciary's institutional hostility toward arbitration.2 40
Their objective was to make arbitration into an acceptable means of
dispute resolution. Federal policy, under Mastrobuono, has distorted
that goal. The pro-arbitration trend in the courts, particularly the fed-
eral judiciary, will flourish and the reasoning of Luckie will be
discredited.
There is, however, a more favorable vantage point from which to
assess Mastrobuono. Although legally insupportable, the Mas-
234. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1995).
235. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (finding that Congress intended to
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements).
236. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 474-76 (1989) (honoring the parties' choice-of-law clause which incorporated Califor-
nia arbitration rules).
237. See id. at 475-76 (stating that federal arbitration policy requires enforcing private agree-
ments to arbitrate according to their own terms).
238. Moses H. Cohen Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 34 (1993).
239. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (reviewing the legislative history of the
FAA which indicates that the purpose of the FAA is to accord arbitration agreements the same
status as other agreements).
240. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting the courts historical opposition to
arbitration).
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trobuono decision serves societal interests. First, by increasing the
scope of arbitrable issues, Mastrobuono tends to lighten the judiciary's
burden. Former Chief Justice Warren Burger has encouraged arbitra-
tion to ease the demands placed on the courts by the "mass neurosis
that leads many people to think courts were created to solve all the
problems of mankind."'241 If court-imposed federal policy, though
contrary to Congressional intent, succeeds in unclogging crowded
courtrooms, benefits to a beleaguered judiciary may justify legally sus-
pect court rulings.
It seems, too, that the courts, viewing arbitration as a substitute for
litigation, have labored to avail injured arbitrating parties the same
relief that a court might grant.242 This predilection to provide the full
panoply of remedies is strongest in the area of securities arbitration,
where broker-dealers notoriously contrive to limit their exposure by
planting self-serving clauses in account agreements. Since the
Supreme Court announced that securities claims are arbitrable, 243 vir-
tually all large securities firms require customers to sign account
agreements containing arbitration clauses.244 Pro-arbitration policy
has doomed most efforts to persuade courts to condemn such arbitra-
tion clauses as unconscionable or unenforceable contracts of adhe-
sion.245 By adding a New York choice-of-law clause to account
agreements, securities firms seek to deny customers punitive reme-
241. Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, 40 AR. J. 3, 5 (Dec. 1985). See
MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 32, § 3.2.5, 3:15 ("Widespread arbitration takes a great deal of
pressure off court dockets. The judicial trend is to encourage more rather than less arbitration in
more diversified contexts.").
242. See Marilyn B. Cane, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The Interplay of State
and Federal Law (or a Smaller Bite of the Big Apple), 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 153, 170 (1993) ("To
conclude that a person has the right to punitive damages in a court setting, but not in an arbitral
setting, would undermine the concept that arbitration is an appropriate alternative forum.").
243. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). In McMahon, the
Supreme Court also held federal RICO claims arbitrable. Id. at 242.
244. See Cane, supra note 242, at 158 (noting the significance of the widespread use of broker-
age firms' customer arbitration agreements); Katsoris, supra note 18, at 578 n.25 (detailing the
typical industry-wide customer agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause). See also
Franklin D. Ormsten, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitrations, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1993 at 1, 31
(stating that "many agreements to arbitrate securities disputes feature a New York choice-of-law
provision (that is to say any issues or disputes will be governed by New York law)").
245. See generally William A. Gregory & William J. Schneider, Securities Arbitration: A Need
for Continued Reform, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1223, 1236-38 (1993) (stating that to establish that an
agreement is unconscionable or an unenforceable contract of adhesion, a party must prove that
it wielded little or no bargaining power and that, as a result of this disadvantage, the other party
exacted unfair terms); Theodore Krebsbach, New York Stock Exchange Symposium on Arbitra-
tion in the Securities Industry, 63 FoDaHt L. REV. 1505, 1513 (1995) (explaining that arbitra-
tion clauses in customer account agreements are contracts of adhesion, but that courts
nevertheless enforce such arbitration clauses because of the federal policy favoring arbitration).
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dies. 246 Chief Judge Breitel cautioned in Garrity that the powerful
might coerce their weaker adversaries into arbitration raising the
specter of excessive punitive awards. 247 His warning that arbitration
should not be a "trap for the unwary"2 48 was prophetic, but not as he
envisioned it. Securities firms foist mandatory arbitration clauses and
choice-of-law provisions on their customers, not to exact punitive
awards but to prevent them.
The Mastrobuonos, however, did not raise issues of adhesion or un-
conscionability. These arguments would most certainly have failed.2 49
Rather, they argued that federal arbitration policy supports the broad
construction of arbitration agreements and prevailed by application of
a curious mixture of preemption and contract analysis. Though the
Court's reasoning is flawed, the result may be sound. In the arena of
securities arbitration, Mastrobuono may indeed safeguard freedom of
contract.250 Limiting the abuses of securities firms is a laudable goal
which gives solace to those who question the faulty conceptual basis of
Mastrobuono.
246. See Cane, supra note 242, at 173 (asserting that securities firm customers are unaware
that they contractually waive the right to punitive relief); Theodore Epstein, Securities Arbitra-
tion: A Need for Continued Reform, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1223, (1993) (rebuking brokerage houses
for scheming in account agreements to "eradicate" customer rights, including the right to receive
punitive damages that might otherwise be recoverable); Katsoris, supra note 18, at 591-96 (ac-
cusing brokerage houses of manipulating unsuspecting customers into surrendering the right to
punitive awards).
247. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 796 (N.Y. 1976).
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 888 F.2d 696, 700 (10th
Cir. 1989) (finding that the arbitration clauses were neither unconscionable, nor contracts of
adhesion); Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that federal pro-arbitration policy defeats the argument that securities account arbitration
clauses are contracts of adhesion); Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th
Cir. 1984) (declining to hold an arbitration provision unconscionable). But see Woodward v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (sustaining uncon-
scionability claim of inexperienced investor). See generally Gregory & Schneider, supra note
245, at 236-39 (summarizing federal cases where parties attacked securities account arbitration
clauses as unconscionable and concluding that most courts have been unfriendly to such argu-
ments); Katsoris, supra note 18, at 595-96 (observing that unconscionability claims in securities
arbitration cases have not fared well in federal court and urging courts to re-appraise their view
so that punitive damages will be available).
250. See Cane, supra note 242, at 171 ("It is implausible that brokerage customers realize that
by signing a customer agreement with a New York governing choice-of-law clause they may have
abandoned any claim they may have to punitive damages.").
